

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
17TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT

AVDB-T

1 August 1967

VC RAID ON QUAN LOI 11 July 1967

1. General:

A. Type of Action: A raid with the intent to destroy the heavy artillery and armored vehicles in an attempt to divert QUAN LOI's ability to support neighboring US/ARVN military installations.

B. Date Time Group: 110120 - 110625 July 1967

C. Friendly Units: Task Force DIXIE, 1-26 Infantry, Platoon of A Troop/1-4 Cavalry, Light Horse Charlie, C/6-15 Arty, A/6-27 Arty. Approximately 1,075 officers and men.

D. Estimated NVA/VC force: Local guerrilla units of approximately company strength supported by the 141 NVC Regiment. Size of force unknown.

E. Location of Battle: QUAN LOI, Vietnam

F. Casualties:

Friendly

KIA: 7
WIA: 27
Equipment Losses: None
Equipment - Damaged: 1 Tank,
2 APCs, 1 2 1/2 T truck
Destroyed: 1 APC

Enemy

KIA: 7
PW: 0
Equipment Captured: 7 AK47s,
7 canteens, 7 ammo pouches,
7 ponchos, 7 bayonets, 10 RPG-2
boosters, 7 RPG rounds, 17 AK47
magazines, 1,000 rds 7.62mm ammo,
52 sachel charges, 30lbs explosives,
2 bangalore torpedoes, 27 hand
grenades, 1 compass, 1 pair sandals,
3 propaganda leaflets.

2. Prior to the Battle:

A. Mission: US units were at QUAN LOI to secure the area under Task Force DIXIE from the VC and to conduct military operations against VC/NVA forces in AO DIXIE.

B. What enemy information was available: None. No indications of the enemy's intent was known prior to the battle. Prior to the battle 5th ARVN reported between 102000H and 110600H the following bridges destroyed. XT872939, XT767761, XT765728, XT694751, XV725014, all unguarded. Also Highway 13 was cratered at XT765712, XT765800, XT817811, and XT816729, impassible for large wheel vehicles.

C. Type of Terrain: The terrain in the QUAN LOI area is characterized by gently rolling hills, with vegetation from sparse to thick in the rain forest jungle that surrounds the large "Terres Rouges" Rubber Plantations. QUAN LOI itself is located in the center of the rubber plantations.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

D. Weather Conditions: Humidity 64 - 100%, thunderstorms, ceiling 500 feet, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile visibility, temperature 74° - 91°. Weather hampered aerial surveillance during the action. The guard on the tower who was on mortar/rocket watch was unable to pinpoint the location of the enemy mortars because of poor visibility.

3. The Battle Narrative: At 0105 hours the first indication of enemy activity occurred when the Quad .50 Platoon sergeant called DIXIE TOC and thought that he detected movement in front of his area towards the southwest. He asked for permission to fire. LTC Hughes, 057160, Commander of Task Force DIXIE North, was awakened and briefed by his staff on the request to fire. He had his TOC call the 1-26 Infantry to check and see if any of their patrols or ambushes were in that area. The 1-26 Infantry TOC checked their companies and then gave DIXIE TOC a negative report. LTC Hughes then gave the Quad .50s permission to open fire. This coordination took approximately 10 minutes to accomplish.

At 0120, shortly after the permission to fire was given to the Quad .50s, the VC commenced his attack by placing 60mm, 82mm, and 4.2" mortar fire on the QUAN LOI base area complex. In the same general area that the Quad .50 machine gun was firing automatic weapons fire and small fire were heard by LTC Hughes. All of the firing occurred in close sequence. At 0121 a FAC, flareship, and a helicopter Light Fire Team request were submitted immediately to the 3d Brigade at LAI KHE "to be on station as soon as possible".

By 0145 there was a lull in the mortar attack and units began receiving small arms fire. Just prior to the lull a mortar round exploded in a tree over the tent of a helicopter crew which had remained overnight at QUAN LOI. Both the aircraft commander and co-pilot were wounded as was one of their crew members. The co-pilot, Warrant Officer Thomas Hirsch, W3156223, a newly arrived officer in-country, despite his wounded arm volunteered to fly the seriously wounded aircraft commander and four other casualties out of QUAN LOI. He took off at a time when mortar, automatic weapons, and small arms fires were being received. It was night with poor flying conditions when Hirsch took off and flew to the 93d Evacuation Hospital under instrument flying conditions.

At 0147 hours A/1-26 Infantry reported seeing, one Viet Cong attempting to get out of the perimeter. The reconnaissance platoon, 1-26 Infantry was moved into positions around the DIXIE NORTH and DOBOL tactical operations centers (TOC).

"Spooky", the armed flareship, reported into the Forward Air Controller's (FAC) net at 0152. The FAC arrived on station about 10 minutes later and began setting up airstrikes.

At 0201 the A/6-27 Artillery reported that there were Viet Cong within the perimeter throwing grenades and satchel charges at the armored personnel carriers and gun positions. Most of the satchel charges failed to explode. The Quad .50 section reported incoming rounds from automatic weapons fire at the northeast corner of the airstrip. The point of origin of this automatic weapons fire was the roof of the French Plantations Administration Building.

At approximately 0205 hours A/1-4 (DRAGOON) Cavalry's positions were attacked from the front and from the rear simultaneously. Dragoon Alfa's # 26 command tank and an APC were hit in the rear by an RPG round; the APC was destroyed as it burst into flames. A/6-27 Artillery (Haymaker) reported that there were more VC inside of the perimeter throwing hand grenades and satchel charges into the artillery gun positions. The penetration of the VC probe was deep into the artillery lines as the FAC where an unexploded satchel charge was found in the morning. In order to restore the perimeter's lines the 1-26 Infantry's reconnaissance

[REDACTED]

platoon was dispatched to the Haymaker/Dragon area. During this period of time for about 30 minutes after the Dragon command track was hit radio communication was lost with DIXIE north. By going on to the Dragon Platoon's radio net communication was finally obtained with the senior NCO who assumed the job of platoon leader.

In addition to the attack at QUAN LOI the US advisor with the 2-9th ARVN at TAM HUNG reported to DIXIE north that a large VC force was moving towards their compound. At 0215 mortars and heavy small arms and automatic weapons fires were hitting the ARVN compound on all sides. DIXIE was informed that the ARVN battalion commander was wounded in action and that they needed the support of US and ARVN artillery and US airstrikes. At this time the attack on QUAN LOI still was heavy in its intensity. To try to render some help to the beleaguered ARVN unit one tube of "Lighthorse Charlie" 4.2" mortars began firing night illumination and four tubes of C/6-15 Artillery fired 105mm howitzers in support of the ARVN action. When the attack on QUAN LOI began to slacken off after 0300 hours and the attack on TAM HUNG increased in its intensity LTC Hughes diverted the Light Fire Team of helicopters and the armed "Spook" flareship to the TAM HUNG area. Inside the ARVN compound was one rifle company and a headquarters company. By 0240 hours 100-150 rounds of VC mortar fire had landed in the ARVN compound; ARVN artillery was reported to be firing at the enemy forces. At 0420 hours the artillery fire was lifted as a light fire team hit the VC positions. At 0500H TAM HUNG received a 30 minute ground attack which was beaten off by the stubborn ARVN defences. Again at 0550H TAM HUNG came under a renewed attack. It was estimated at the time that 2 battalions of VC or NVA were attacking them. By 0610H the VC/NVA force broke contact with the ARVN and withdrew to the northeast.

While QUAN LOI and TAM HUNG were under attack the AN LOC Special Forces camp reported that it was under a mortar attack; however negative mortar rounds landed inside the compound. It should be noted that AN LOC is a provincial capital, QUAN LOI is a major US military forward base support area for operation in War Zones D/C and along Highway 13, and TAM HUNG was the base of the 2-9 ARVN Infantry which were successfully pursuing an aggressive Revolutionary Development Program in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI/LOC NINH area.

The battle at QUAN LOI continued. At 0250H an ambush patrol on the ridgeline to the northwest from B/1-26 Infantry reported that there were VC between them and the perimeter. These VC were setting up a mortar to their front at XT810910. By 0315 hours the Reconnaissance Platoon 1-26 Infantry reached the French Club swimming pool area. Several reports had been made of VC infiltrators moving out from the club at the start of the attack throwing grenades and satchel charges. VC also fired their weapons from the French club at the A/1-4 Cavalry element in the vicinity of the club. One M113's crew received 100% casualties by a VC grenade exploding at the rear entrance of their track. One could also see the bullet holes in a C ration box on top of the track and a tank in the area. These bullet holes indicated enemy small arms and automatic weapons from the rear. In other words enemy fire was being placed or directed on the US troops from inside the perimeter as well as from the outside.

At 0336H the ambush patrol from B/1-26 Infantry reported that the VC were displacing their mortar tubes forward of their location at coordinates XT813912. Then at 0350H the VC again launched an attack in the vicinity of the swimming pool (XT811906). D Company 1st Engineer Bn. was instructed to send reinforcements to that area to counter the attack. At the same time C/1-26 Infantry received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire from the French Plantation Administration Building. A squad of C/1-26 Infantry was sent to the building to check it out. At 0720H the squad reported the building to be empty of personnel but they found 8 batteries and parts from a US claymore inside of the building.

ridge to the north was working its way back to the perimeter when 3 men were wounded by the "Spooky" mini-guns, "Spooky" was ordered to cease fire immediately. During the battle airstrikes and "Spooky" had placed their fires on the ridge to the north of the airstrip.

Again at 0430 VC mortar rounds 60mm, 82mm and 4.2" began falling into the QUAN LOI perimeter again along with small arms and automatic weapons fire. One should note that at 0345 the VC began to withdraw to the northwest past 2 empty rubber storage sheds. A break in the barbed wire was later found which the VC used in the route of withdrawal. By 0610H the VC had broken contact and the artillery continued to hammer away at VC withdrawal routes.

During the attack approximately 200 rounds of mortar fire fell on QUAN LOI. Once the base was hit with mortars the VC ground raid commenced. It is believed that the VC infiltrated at an earlier time and stayed in the French Club-swimming pool area overnight. When the mortar attack began they commenced their attack. Also the VC seen on top of the Administration Building may have infiltrated in around the same time as the group in the French Club.

4. Artillery Support:

A total of approximately 3,843 rounds of artillery were fired by US/ARVN forces in defense of the AN LOC/QUAN LOI/TAN HUNG complex that was under attack. The following is a breakdown of total expenditures:

105mm HE	2629
105mm ILL	52
4.2" HE	575
4.2" ILL	372
155mm	200
175mm	15
8"	60
GRAND TOTAL	3903

(includes ARVN estimates)

The following figures reflect the ammunition expenditure by US artillery at QUAN LOI:

105mm HE	1829
105mm ILL	52
4.2" HE	575
4.2" ILL	372
175mm	15
8"	60
sub total	2903

The following is an ARVN estimate of ARVN artillery ammunition expended:

105mm	800
155mm	200
sub total	1000 (est)

5. Airstrikes:

	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>TOT</u>	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Location Supported</u>
A.	RRO1	0300	500HD/NAP	QUAN LOI
B.	Blade 03	0320	500HD/NAP	QUAN LOI
C.	Blade 01	0435	500LD/Rockets	TAN HUNG 2-9 ARVN
D.	Box 01	0515	500HD/NAP	TAN HUNG 2-9 ARVN
E.	Buzz 01	0550	CBU/NAP	QUAN LOI
F.	Box 01	0600	CBU/NAP	QUAN LOI

G. Blade 05 loaded with CBU/NAP arrived on station but his ordnance was not expended because the weather had closed in and was poor.

A total of 12 T-10 air sorties took part in the attack.

6. Helicopter gunship support:

A total of 3 helicopter fire teams supported the action as follows:

Unit	Hours	7.62mm	40mm	2.75mm
1st Aviation Bn	6.4	10,000 rds	500 rds	56 rds
11th Aviation Bn	18.7	32,000 rds	850 rds	98 rds
TOTAL	25.1	42,000 rds	1350 rds	154 rds

7. Information Received After the Action:

A. A VC captured during the attack on TAN HUNG was identified as the XO of the 4th Bn, 141 NVA Regiment. He stated that for the past few days his unit had been in the DONG XOAI area and that his unit moved to the east bank of the SONG HE River and from there marched 2 days to the AN LOC area. He reported the strength of the regiment as 1060 men with 300 men in each of the 2d, 3d 4th Bns and 160 men in the 1st (Support) Bn. He stated that the entire regiment took part in the attack and will now move back to the SONG HE River.

B. NGUYEN VAN DO a CHIEU HOI rallier to LOC NINH on 100600 July 1967. He stated that he was a squad leader of the Recon Team, 2d Platoon, 7th Company, 5th Bn 272 Regiment. He stated that on 27 June the regiment was ordered to move to BINH LONG. He stated that his battalion moved north generally parallel to the Cambodian border, then east to the vicinity of LOC NINH. He stated that he left his unit as they were moving south along Highway 13.

1 Incl

1. Map Sheet 6332 III N
(Series L8020)

George E. Creighton, Jr.
GEORGE E. CREIGHTON, JR.
Captain, Infantry
Commanding